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Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234'Optimal tax formulas are either guides to action or nothing at all."
Frank Hahn (1973)
Should additional revenue be raised by introducing a value-added tax.
increasing income tax rates, or by enforcing the existing income tax more
effectively?Should the attempt to tax income progressively be abandoned?
Should the income tax be scrapped entirely, and replaced with a consumption
tax? A normative theory of taxation, as a guide to action, should illuminate
these and other fundamental questions of current and future tax policy.
The theory of optimal taxation has, for the past two decades, been the
reigning normative approach to taxation. During its reign it has generated
several useful insights about the relationships between assumptions about the
set of tax instruments available to the government, the structure of the
economy, and the objectives of tax policy.However, I will argue in this
paper that in its current State optimal tax theory is incomplete as a guide to
action concerning the questions that began this paper and for other critical
issues in tax policy.It is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms
with taxation as a system of coercively collecting revenues from individuals
whowilltend to resist. The coercive nature of collecting taxes implies that
the resource cost of implementing a tax system is large. Furthermore,
alternative tax systems differ greatly in the resource cost of operation.
Differences in the ease of administering various taxes have been and will
continue to be a critical determinant of appropriate tax policy.
As a prelude to my argument,Iwill first walk the reader through three
of the principal propositions of optimal tax theory, pointing out along the
way the key assumptions of the restricted problem under consideration) Next.-2-
I conwient on the influence of the theory on recent tax policy developments. I
conclude by sketching an alternative to optimal taxation, which I call the
theory of optimal tax systems.This theory embraces the insights of optimal
taxation but also takes seriously the technology of raising taxes and the
constraints placed upon tax policy by that technology. A theory of optimal
tax systems has the promise of addressing some of the fundamental issues of
tax policy in a more satisfactory way than the theory of optimal taxation.
Three Cornerstones of the Theory of Optimal Taxation
Comon Structure
A typical exercise in optimal taxation has three key aspects.First,
there is an explicit representation of individuals preferences, technology
(usually constant returns to scale), and market structure (usually perfect
competition).Second, the government must raise a fixed amount of revenue
with a limited set of tax instruments which can be administered costlessly.
Lump-sum taxes, for which the tax liability is unrelated to any economic
decision, are often ruled out.Given the assumptions about the economy, any
choice of tax instruments is associated with a consumption bundle for each
individual.Finally, there is a criterion function which ranks outcomes and
chooses the best ('optimal") tax system amongthelimitedsetavailable. In
models with one representative individual, this criterion is simply his or her
level of utility.In models with heterogeneous individuals, a utilitarian
social welfare function is used to aggregate the individuals' levels of
utility into a measure of social welfare.2
The spirit of the optimal tax literature is that the efficiency costs of
taxation are potentially large, and therefore it is worthwhile to focus
attention on how to minimize these costs.In the simplest of the models,—3-.
minimizing efficiency Costs is the only objective.In more sophisticated
models, tax systems are also evaluated by how they affect the distribution of
welfare, and the efficiency costs must be balanced against the distributional
implications.
Optimal Conmiodity Taxation
In the basic problem of optimal commodity taxation, the government must
raise a fixed amount of real resources and can levy only commodity taxes. All
taxpayers are identical (in tastes and endowment), so the government need not
be concerned with questions of vertical equity (how the tax burden varies
across taxpayers of different means) or horizontal equity (how the tax burden
varies across taxpayers of identical means).Any pattern of taxes can be
raised without administrative or compliance cost.
What set of commodity taxes will raise the required revenue and leave the
taxpayer as well off as possible? Or to put it another way, what set of taxes
minimizes the efficiency cost of the tax burden? Frank Ramsey solved this
problem more than 60 years ago, though its solution may still come as a
surprise to those readers whose first instinct is to assume that the lowest
efficiency cost will be achieved with the fewest distortions in relative
prices.Ramsey (1927) showed that a uniform commodity tax system, which
alters none of the relative prices of goods, is in general not optimal.
Instead, efficiency cost minimizing commodity taxes will in general differ by
commodity, such that more inelastically demanded goods tend to attract higher
tax rates. In fact, with certain strong simplifying assumptions, an 'inverse
elasticity rule' applies exactly; the tax rate is inversely proportional to a
good's own compensated elasticity of demand.
Why the apparently benign rule of uniform taxation is generally not
optimal should become clear once the second-best nature of the problem is—4-
understood.The first-best solution is to impose a lump-sum tax on the
representative taxpayer.In that way the required revenue can be achieved
with no efficiency cost at all.Because lump-sum taxes are ruled Out by
assumption,any tax system will inevitably cause some distortions as
individuals substitute away from relatively highly taxed goods to relatively
lightly taxed goods. A uniform tax on all commodities (other than leisure)
reduces the relative price of leisure with respect to each commodity, causing
an inefficiently large consumption of leisure. The optimal tax pattern should
take advantage of commodities relative substitutability or complementarity
with leisure.A complement to leisure, such as skis, should be taxed
relatively heavily and a substitute for leisure (complement to labor), such as
work uniforms, should be taxed relatively lightly. The extent to which this
relative substitutability should be exploited is limited by the fact that non-
uniform taxes do cause inefficiency in the consumption pattern of non-leisure
goods. Uniform commodity taxation is optimal under very restrictive
conditions.
Can these prescriptions for optimal commodity taxation be made
operational? Deaton (1987), for one, has expressed considerable skepticism.
He first points out that common restrictions on preferences that are made to
facilitate estimation presuppose the optimal tax solution. For example, given
a linear expenditure system, uniform taxation is optimal regardless of the
system's parameters. Thus, estimation done within that framework is
pointless. With the right kind of data, preferences can be represented by a
flexible enough functional form so that measurements are not merely
assumptions in disguise. However, note that calculating the optimal commodity
tax rates may require knowing price and income responses at points quite
different from the current position or anything else previously observed.-5—
Deaton concludes that such global knowledge of preferences is probably
unobtainable.Stern (1987) is less pessimistic. While he acknowledges the
difficulties involved in estimation, he claims (p. 86) that we do know a lot
about the relevant relationships (elasticitiesi and will therefore be
negligent... if we suppressed or ignored this information.' Because
predicting the effects of small changes from a given tax system requires only
knowledge of the current position and derivatives of demand functions, some
have suggested that the main use of optimal tax theory is for tax reform, and
that policy should focus on tax reform.
If taxpayers have different endowments, then the optimal cormuodity tax
structure must consider not only its efficiency cost, but also its effect on
the distribution of consumer welfare.Not surprisingly, in this case the
optimal tax on luxury goods is higher than otherwise and the optimal tax on
necessary goods is lower than otherwise. Of course, when one can also choose
an income tax at the same time as cormnodity taxes, then the income tax can
accomplish much of the redistributional task. The presence of this additional
instrument critically changes the nature of the optimal comodity tax
Structure.Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that, when a general
income tax structure is available, consnodity taxes will not be part of the
optimum tax structure whenever the utility function is weakly separable
between labor and all goods together.4
In the past decade, Feldstein and others have argued that the
quantitatively significant distortions caused by the tax system are
intertemporal rather than intratemporal, and have focused attention on the
taxation of capital income and away from the taxation of comodities at a
point in time.Fortunately, by distinguishing goods according to date of
consumption, the insights of optimal commodity taxation have been usefully-6—
applied to the question of whether capital income ought to be taxed. To see
this, consider a two-period model with three goods: first-.period consumption,
first-period leisure, and second-period consumption.It is assumed that the
individual chooses how much to work in the first period, but does not work in
the second period.The government must raise a fixed amount of revenue in
present value, and can levy conmodity taxes on consumption in either period.
In this model the tax treatment of capital income is implicit in the
relative tax impact on consumption in the two periods.Imposing equal tax
rates on consumption in each period is equivalent to a wage tax or consumption
tax.Similarly, when the tax rate on second-period consumption exceeds (is
less than) the tax on first-period consumption, capital income is subject to a
positive (negative) tax.5
The theory of optimal conunodity taxation tells us that the efficient
pattern of taxation depends on the relative substitutability of consumption in
each time period for leisure. If first-period consumption is relatively more
substitutable for first-period leisure, then it should be taxed relatively
lightly, implying a positive tax on capital income. If, on the other hand.
second-period consumption is relatively more substitutable, then a subsidy to
capital income is called for. In the event they are equally substitutable, a
zero tax on capital income (that is. a consumption or wage tax) is optimal, so
that the tax rate on first-period and second-period consumption should be
equal.
Feldstein (1978) argued that reasonable values for the wage elasticity of
labor supply and the interest elasticity of savings imply that capital income
was taxed too highly at that time.He estimated that eliminating capital
income taxation and replacing the lost revenue with higher taxes on labor
would reduce the efficiency cost of taxation by 18 percent of tax revenue.—7—
King (1980). though, points out that these reasonable parameter values used by
Feldstein happen to imply the optimality of consumption taxation.In any
event, Deaton's pessimism over the ability of econometricians to provide the
parameters of optimal tax formulae applies even more strongly to the structure
of intertemporal. preferences than it does to preferences at a point in time.
I am very doubtful that we'll ever know much about the relative
substitutability of leisure with consumption of different periods.In fact.
many attempts to estimate intertemporal preferences empirically begin with
functional form restrictions that practically guarantee the dominance of
consumption taxation over income taxation.
In a model of overlapping generations without bequests, the effect of
taxation on the capital-labor ratio becomes an additional issue. When, in the
absence of taxation, the steady-state capital-labor ratio would be below the
level that maximizes utility, an optimal tax policy must not only consider the
distortion in the lifetime consumption pattern but also whether it moves the
capital-labor ratio closer to or farther from its optimum level and how it
affects the intergenerational distribution of welfare.Suniners (1981) has
suggested that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution may be so high
that these other issues dominate the life cycle distortion issue. This occurs
because tax-induced changes in the initial after-tax interest rate cause so
much response in saving and, eventually, the capital-labor ratio that the new
equilibrium after-tax interest is not much changed, so that life-cycle
consumption decisions are not much affected.Then the critical question
becomes what tax structure is most effective in raising the capital-labor
ratio.This may depend critically on the timing of the tax liability and on
the government's ability to use debt policy to affect saving.-8-
Production Efficiency
Now suppose that, in addition to conunodity taxes, the government can also
raise revenue by levying various kinds of production taxes on firms and on
suppliers of inputs. To what extent should these taxes be used to supplement
(or replace) conunodity taxes?
The short answer to this crucial problem, provided by Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971), is that as long as commodity taxes can be set without
constraints (and therefore optimally) and if there are no privately received
economic profits (either because there are constant returns to scale or
because of 100 percent profits taxation) ,thentaxes should be set to achieve
production efficiency. In other words, all firms (both private and government
enterprises> should face the same vector of prices.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. With no constraint
on commodity taxes, any set of after-tax prices, including the optimal one,
can be achieved with commodity taxes alone.6 Any other taxes may increase the
efficiency cost and cannot improve on the minimal efficiency cost achieved in
their absence.
This result is potentially important because achieving production
efficiency rules out a long list of taxes.On the proscribed list are
corporation income taxes, origin-based commodity or capital income taxes,
tariffs,sector-specific investment or employment incentives, taxes on
intermediate goods, and the tax exemption of non-market labor supply.
However, the conditions necessary to seek production efficiency, and to
therefore rule Out such taxes, are not realistic. Production efficiency is in
general not desirable when there are constraints on how commodities and
profits can be taxed.For example, if a commodity tax cannot be imposed on
some good, a tax on factor income earned in that sector may serve as a partial-9-
substitute.If certain cotrsnodities must be taxed at identical rates, then
differential taxation on factors in those industries is generally desirable.
Furthermore,if 100 percent taxation of profits cannot be achieved,
differential taxation of factors can serve as a substitute for the profits
tax; the greater the share of profits in an industry, the larger should the
differential factor tax be. In the absence of 100 percent taxation of
profits, the structure of optimal cosunodity taxes as well as the optimal
structure of factor taxes is changed.
Administrative problems are often at the heart of why optimal colmiodity
and profits taxation are not implemented, thus opening the way for taxes which
interfere with production efficiency.7It is difficult to tax the rental
value of owner-occupied housing and other consumer durables, consumption of
family-provided domestic services, and consumption of nonmarketed agricultural
produce. It is difficult to tax labor used in household production. The cost
of administering any tax system increases with the number of different tax
rates that are imposed, so that only a small number of tax rates may be
desirable. It is difficult to distinguish between capital and wage income in
unincorporated enterprises; therefore it is difficult to maintain different
rates of tax. Because of the difficulty of separately measuring pure profits
and capital income, 100 percent taxation of profits is problematic at best.
Thus, problems that arise in administering real tax systems may often
make some forms of production tax appropriate, even if such a tax works
against production efficiency. The importance of feasibility constraints in
defining and collecting taxes will be a recurring theme of this paper.
Optimal Tax Progressivity
Many analyses of taxation address the problem of taxing a single
representative consumer, but this convenient assumption sidesteps the thorny-10-
issues of interpersonal comparisons of welfare,When the assumption of a
representative consumer is abandoned to face the reality of heterogeneous
individuals, optimal tax solutions get more complicated. As mentioned
earlier, the optimal conmodity tax solution must be modified to account for
the income elasticity of coimnodities and the social weight put on
redistributing welfare through the fiscal systems. Production efficiency is
no longer necessarily desirable (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1972).
Restricting attention to consnodity taxes at various rates is surely
inappropriate once redistributional issues are admitted. On the other hand,
coamiodity taxes which vary with the circumstances of the buyer are conceivable
but usually impractical.Personal income taxes, though, are flexible enough
that the average tax rate may vary by individual (although not without cost).
thus allowing the pursuit of redistributional goals.
Mirrlees (1971) initiated the modern debate on how progressive the income
tax should be. In his formulation, the government seeks to maximize a
utilitarian social welfare function, and must choose an income tax schedule
subject to raising some given amount of total revenue.8 A progressive tax on
ability, which would cause no efficiency cost, is ruled out on the grounds
that ability is impossible for the government to observe.
Hirrlees first investigated what characterizes the optimal income tax for
any set of assumptionsaboutthe social welfare function, the distribution of
endowments, and the behavioral response (utility) functions.He concluded
that only very weak conditions characterize the optimal tax structure in the
general case: that the marginal tax rate at all levels of income lies between
zero and 100 percent, and that in most of the interesting cases some of the
population will choose to not work at all. Clearly these requirements offer
us little concrete guidance in the construction of a tax schedule.-1.1-
But one result of this general literature is surprising--that the
marginal tax rate at the highest level of income should be precisely zero.9
This is true as long as there is a known upper bound to the income
distribution and regardless of the form of the social welfare function,
provided that the welfare of the most well off individual carries some
positive weight.10 To see the intuition behind this result, first consider an
income tax schedule in which the marginal rate applicable to the highest
observed income is positive.Now consider a second tax schedule which is
identical to the first except that it allows the highest-earning household to
pay no taxes on any excess of income over what it would have earned under the
first tax schedule. When faced with the second tax schedule this household is
certainly better off, works more hours, and pays no less tax than under the
first schedule.All other households are at least as well off (and may be
strictly better off if the top marginal tax rate is set to be slightly
positive and the increased revenue from the highest-earning household allows a
reduction in average tax rates in the lower brackets).In other words,
raising the marginal tax at the top above zero distorts the labor supply
decision of the highest earner but raises no revenue.
This resul,.t calls to mind Edgeworth's (undated, p. 9) conunent about
Marshalls discovery of the Giffen good:'Only a very clever man would
discover that exceptional case; only a very foolish man would take it as the
basis of a rule for general practice.' The result does not imply that marginal
taxes should be zero or very low near the top, only precisely at the top. In
fact, numerical calculations by Mirrises (1976, p.340) suggest that zero
is a bad approximation to the (optimal] marginal tax rate even within most of
the top .. .percentiles.'-12-
Although I feel that this result should not be taken seriously as a
practical guide to tax policy, it does provide some insight into the question
of optimal tax progressivity. It highlights the possibility that a
utilitarian social objective function, even one that places a large weight on
the welfare of the poor, is not necessarily maximized through high marginal
tax rates on the rich. In fact, the poor can only be made less well off by a
non-zero marginal tax rate at the very top. The numerical examples I discuss
below indicate that, more generally, the poor may be best served by tax
systems which are less leveling than intuition might suggest.
The literature offers no other completely general results.In their
absence, the approach has been to make specific assumptions about the elements
of the model and in some cases to limit the class of income tax system under
study (usually to linear or flat-rate schedules), and then to calculate the
parameters of the optimal income tax system.This approach is meant to
suggest the characteristics of the optimal income tax under reasonable
assumptions and to investigate how these characteristics depend on the
elements of the model.
Mirrlees pioneered this approach in his 1971 article. Assuming a simple
utilitarian social welfare function, a lognormal distribution of ability, and
an identical Cobb-Douglas utility function of goods and leisure for each
individual, he calculated that the optimal tax structure is approximately
linear (that is, it has a constant marginal tax rate and an exemption level
below which tax liability is negative) and has marginal tax rates which were
quite low by then current standards, usually between 20 and 30 percent and
almost always less than 40 percent.11
Subsequent work investigated the sensitivity of the optimal income tax to
the parametric assumptions. Mirrlees showed that widening the distribution of-13—
skills increased the optimal marginal tax rates, though he considered the
dispersion of skills necessary to imply much higher rates to be unrealistic.
Atkinson (1973) explored the effect of increasing the egalitarianism of the
social welfare function.Even in the extreme case of the Rawlsian maximin
social welfare function, where social welfare is judged solely on the basis of
how well off the worst-off person is. the model generated optimal tax rates
not much higher than 50 percent.Finally, Stern (1976) suggested that the
degree of labor supply responsiveness implied by the Cobb-Douglas utility
function is excessive and thus overstates the costs of increasing tax
progressivity. He claimed that when a more reasonable estimate of labor
supply responsiveness is used (with an elasticity of substitution of 0.4
rather than the unitary elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas formulation) the value
of the optimal tax rate is substantially higher than otherwise, 54% in his
central case compared to 20 or 30% in the Cobb-Douglas case.12
In sum, simple models of optimal income taxation do not generally point
to sharply progressive tax structures, even if the objective function puts
relatively large weight on the welfare of less well-off individuals.This
conclusion does, though, depend on the wage elasticity of labor supply. Low
elasticities, which imply a low marginal cost of redistributing income through
the tax system, can impiy highly progressive tax structures, so that lack of
consensus about elasticities precludes consensus about optimal progessivity.
Furthermore, the models that have been applied to this question have been very
stylized, for the most part ignoring such issues as uncertainty, dynamic
factors such as bequests and inheritance, tax evasion, and tax arbitrage.13
For example, considering only linear tax schedules (with one marginal tax rate
and a demogrant) undoubtedly sacrifices some flexibility in redistribution.
However, eliminating the graduated rate structure promises substantial—14—
simplification in the tax system by minimizing the incentive to arrange
transactions to move income from high tax rate to low tax rate individuals.
The tradeoff between the distributional flexibility of graduated income tax
systems and the benefits of a flat rate is ignored in the standard models
which either assume a flat rate or do not consider tax arbitrage.
The Guiding Principles of Recent U.S. Tax Reform
Recent changes in the statutory progressivity of the individual income
tax are an apparent testimony to Keynes' statement about the policy influence
of academic scribblers.When the optimal progressivity literature first
surfaced in the early 1970s, the top marginal tax rate in the U.S. stood at 70
percent. (It had been 91 percent as recently as 1963.) As of January 1, 1988,
the marginal tax rate on the highest income has fallen to 28 percent. a
remarkably steep drop.In fact, the top marginal income tax rate has fallen
in nearly every OECD country, in many cases quite substantially.The most
recent drop in the top U.S. marginal rate was accompanied by broadening the
tax base, in particular by subjecting realized nominal capital gains to full
taxation, when only 40 percent of long-term gains had been taxable previously.
The optimal progressivity literature does not directly addressthe
appropriateness of lowered marginal tax rates when achieved by eliminating
aspects of preferential tax treatment.Nevertheless, a key message of the
optimal progressivity literature, that high marginal rates may not be
appropriate even for egalitarian social welfare functions, has apparently won
the day.
Judging by the recent debate over tax reform, the lessons of the optimal
coimnodity tax literature have not had much of an impact on tax policy. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury's initial proposal in 1984 favored a
comprehensive income tax and defended it on, among other things, efficiency—15—
grounds: 'A comprehensive tax base is .. .necessaryfor economic neutrality,
since ...discriminationbetween various ways of earning and spending income
distort economic decisions (p. 25).'This statement is incorrect if one
interprets 'economic neutrality' to mean causing no distortions, as that can
be achieved only with a lump-sum tax.The theory of optimal connodity
taxation suggests that minimal (as opposed to zero) distortion is achieved
with a comprehensive income tax base only if utility functions satisfy fairly
strong conditions which certainly have not been decisively established by
econometric investigation. Yet the tax reform movement championed minimal tax
differentiation of sources and uses of income. Interestingly, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 did not substantially change the average rate of tax on saving and
investment, rejecting the intertemporal version of uniform taxation of goods
which would exempt capital income from taxation in favor of a consumption
base.
The desirability of production efficiency, usually referred to as a
"level playing field,' was a Consistent theme of many tax reform proposals.
including the Treasury's initial proposal and the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
These proposals sought to reduce the apparently widespread disparities in
effective capital income tax rates across industries and types of capital
investments. Production efficiency precludes the differential taxation of the
inputs to firms, whether the tax is differentiated by section of use or by
type of input, since either would distort production decisions.
The apparent triumph of production efficiency as a goal is somewhat
surprising in view of the strong assumptions needed to demonstrate its
desirability. The wide acceptance of this goal led Feldstein (1985) to point
Out that as long as the income from some capital goods would be untaxed (as
would characterize the return to owner-occupied housing in all the major-16-
proposals). it is not in general optimal to tax uniformly the income from
those forms of capital which are taxable.Sunnners (1987) further argued that
the potential efficiency gain from eliminating differential taxation of
different types of capital income is small, and that attention paid to this
problem diverts attention from the overall level of taxation of capital
income, which in his view is far more important in determining the efficient
operation of the economy.
Clearly the spirit of optimal taxation theory,that tax-induced
inefficiencies are potentially large and must be considered in the design of
policy, has infused the recent tax reformmovement)4 However, policymakers
have been selective in adopting the lessons of the theory. Marginal tax rates
have come down significantly, and a partial move toward undifferentiated
capital income taxes has been accomplished.However, little attention has
been paid to differential coamiodity taxes or to changing the effective rate of
tax on saving and investment.I suspect that the ascendancy of uniform
taxation, at least in its intratemporal version, is due to the lack of strong
evidence pointing toa clear alternative and the sense that a uniform tax
system is less susceptible to political pressures favoring tax changes that
serve special interests and are unrelated to optimal tax considerations)5
What strikes me most about the tax policy debates of recent years is that
many of the critical issues lie outside the usual domain of optimal taxation
theory.Simplification, tax shelters, and inflation-induced problems were of
major concern during the debate leading up to the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
Since 1986 debate has focused on the appropriate level of enforcement of
existing tax laws, the taxation of capital gains, and whether a value-added
tax should be added to the federal arsenal of tax instruments.Although
optimal taxation theory is useful for analyzing some aspects of some of these
issues, in many cases it cannot address the principal questions.-17—
One reason that the theory of optimal taxation is incomplete as a guide
to action is that its models, like all models, are imbedded in Stylized
versions of the environment and tax systems.The usual stylizations exclude
such potentially important featuresof the world such asimperfect
competition, increasing returns to scale, and unemployment.I believe that
its critical problem is the failure to consider the technology of collecting
taxes. In the next section I argue it is this omission which severely limits
applicability of optimal taxation theory to many current policy problems.
Optimal Tax Systems and the Technology of Tax Collection
The leap from the blackboard to the real world is a large one when it
comes to taxation.In the United States, operating the tax system requires
the participation of over one hundred million taxpayers, hundreds of thousands
of tax professionals, and a multi-billion dollar budget for the Internal
Revenue Service and its state counterparts.The resource cost of operating
the income tax system alone, including the administrative Cost borne by the
government and the compliance cost borne by the taxpayers, has been estimated
to be as high as $35 billion annually, or about 7 percent of revenue (Slenrod
and Sorum, 1984).This cost is large both in absolute terms and relative to
the distortionary costs of taxation. For example, it is more than twice as
high as recent estimates of the efficiency Cost of the nonuniform taxation of
assets used within the corporate sector (Summers,1987).
Moreimportant than the magnitude of the costs, though, the ease of
administering various taxes has critical implications for the optimal
structure of tax systems. As discussed earlier, tax codes which are based on
unobservable and practically unnieasureable quantities (such as an ability tax)
often look desirable on paper.The choice among real tax systems must
confront the fact that some taxes can be administered more easily than others.-18-
Ifoptimal taxtheoryis to be a reliable guide to action, it must consider
the issues that arise in operating the tax system.
Integrating the issue of administrative ease into optimal tax theory will
require a shift of emphasis away from the structure of preferences, which has
been the principal focus of optimal tax theory, toward the technology of tax
collection. In what follows, I will use the term optimal tax systems to refer
to the normative theory of taxation that considers not only the structure of
preferences but also takes seriously the technology of collecting taxes.
The Choice of Tax Instruments
With some exceptions, optimal tax theory has dealt with the issue of
administering a tax by making extreme assumptions about what kinds of taxes
are available to the policymaker. Each of the three cornerstones of optimal
tax theory depends on implicit assumptions about which taxes can be
administered and which cannot.The problem of optimal coasnodity taxation is
interesting only because the possibility of lump-sum taxation is ruled out,
presumably because it is infeasible. Production efficiency is desirable Only
if all cootodities can be taxed and 100 percent taxation of profits is
feasible (or if no profits exist).When consumers are not identical, an
ability tax dominates an income tax because it causes no distortion in
behavior.The study of optimal income taxation is appropriate when ability
taxes are ruled out, usually by appealing to the difficulties of measuring
ability.
Extreme assumptions about the feasibility of tax instruments are
analytically convenient but incorrect. Ability can be measured, although with
some expense and error. On the other hand, income Cannot be measured
perfectly, and the degree of accuracy in income measurement depends on the
resources expended toward this goal.-19—
Extreme assumptions about the feasibility of tax instruments may also
preclude consideration of fundamental changes in policy.16For example, a
common assumption made in optimal taxation models of developing countries is
that income and consumption arising in the agricultural sector are not
taxable, although marketable surplus is taxable. Much interesting analysis
proceeds from this assumption, but none asks at what point it makes sense for
a country to attempt to tax agricultural income, even assuming that it will
have only limited success in doing so. There is strong evidence (Riezman and
Slemrod, 1987) that countries with low literacy rates tend to rely on highly
distorting but (relatively) easily collectable import and export taxes, and
shy away from efficient but administratively difficult land taxes. Under what
conditions should an imperfect land tax be tried?The answers to these
questions depend on the resource cost of administering the new tax instrument.
relative to its effectiveness, or degree of success. This latter notion has
several dimensions, including the true revenue yield and the extent and nature
of the mistakes that are made in administration.
Some initial progress has been made in analyzing the optimal choice of
tax instruments.Stern (1982) models the choice between two distinct tax
systems: an optimal nonlinear income tax, where income is costlessly
observable,and asystem of differential lump-sum taxesbased on
characteristics of taxpayers which can be ascertained with some error.The
lump-sumtaxsystem is superior if there are no errors in classifying
individuals but, when enough mistakes are made, income taxation may be the
preferred system.
Sterns analysis recognizes that the two tax systems each have their own
informationrequirements (thelump-sumsystemrequiresclassifying
individuals, the income tax system requires observing incomes).The two-20-
systems will, also likely have different administrative costs as well, although
Stern assumes these costs are identical for the sake of simplicity. Greater
accuracy in the classification of individuals could be achieved with higher
cost, as could more accurate measurement of income.
Yitzhaki (1979) investigates the optimal cormnodity tax base when there is
a resource cost to adding goods to the tax base. If, as he assumes,
preferences over all goods are Cobb-Douglas, then uniformity of rate for all
taxed goods is optimal.Expanding the tax base to cover more goods will
reduce the excess burden of taxation, but increase the administrative cost.
The optimal. tax system equates the marginal excess burden of the taxes to the
marginal administrative Cost, and thus minimizes the total resource cost of
raising revenue.
The fact that changes in administrative costs are likely to be
discontinuous with respect to changes in tax policy is troubling in more
general treatments of the optimal set of tax instruments.The theory of
optimaltaxationtells us that, in general, all goods should be taxed at
different rates.But administrative cost is likely to be lower whenever the
rate on substitutable goods is uniform.It may be that the cost depends on
the number of different taxrates, ratherthan the number of comodities
taxed,as Yitzhaki assumed.
Thecost of administering a commodity tax system undoubtedly depends not
onlyon the number of commodities covered, but also on the number of different
ratesimposed.This is not an issue when a demand structure that implies
uniformoptimal taxes is assumed(i.e., Cobb-Douglas), but is very important
undera more general demand structure.
Manyof these concerns are relevant to the debate in the U.S. over
introducing a value-added tax to raise additional revenue.The cost of the-21-
new administrative machinery would not be trivial.The Treasury Department
(1984) estimated it would cost about $700 million per year, and require about
20.000 additional employees. The British experience with the VAT (see
Sandford, et al. 1981) suggests that the cost borne by taxpayers is probably
five times higher, bringing the total collection cost to nearly 3 percent of
the revenue raised from a 7Z VAT.17 Obviously these costs could be avoided if
additional revenue came from existing taxes rather than introducing a new tax.
One argument for the value-added tax is that it can be self-enforcing.
Under the invoice method of value-added taxation, each firm pays tax on its
sales and receives a credit for taxes invoiced by its suppliers. Thus evasion
by suppliers through understating tax collected is counteracted by purchasers
interest in ensuring that all tax paid is recorded.Similarly, evasion by
purchasers in overstating tax paid runs counter to the interest of suppliers.
Of course, this self-enforcement aspect of value-added taxes can be eroded by,
for example, counterfeiting of invoices.Moreover, this tendency to self-
enforcement is not effective at the retail level, which can comprise as much
as half of the tax base. Although the European experience suggests that this
advantage is not fully realized in practice, the revenue loss from evasion
(estimated in the United Kingdom to be 1.5 percent of potential revenue
(Hemming and Kay,1981),is probably very low compared to the revenue loss
18
from income tax evasion.
The European experience with the value-added tax also suggests that the
potential simplicity of the value-added tax isseriously eroded when
differentiated rates and exemptions (usually designed to lessen regressivity)
are introduced, as they have been in all European countries and would likely
be in the United States (Aaron, 1981). Thus, any desire to discriminate among
conmiodities on optimal tax grounds must be balanced against the additional
cost of administering such a system.-22-
Although the apparent discontinuity of administrative cost functions
poses analytical difficulties, a more profound problem is that the quality of
tax administration is variable.Until now, in treating the question of
whether to have or not have a particular tax, I've assumed that a tax is
perfectly enforced after it is enacted. In fact, for any given tax structure
more resources expended in enforcement can reduce the extent of tax evasion
and therefore produce more revenue, reduce distortions, and improve horizontal
equity. This is my next topic.
Tax Evasion
The Internal Revenue Service (1988) has estimated that in 1987
noncompliance with the individual and corporation income tax cost the Treasury
$84.9 billion, comprising over twenty percent of tax liability.Since 1973
the lost revenue had been rising faster than nominal income for each year
until 1986.Although comparable studies for other countries do not exist,
anecdotal evidence suggests that the extent of tax noncompliance is even
larger in other countries.
Tax evasion is widespread, and its presence has serious implications for
the equity, efficiency, and collection cost of alternative tax systems.
(Skinner and Slemrod (1985) discuss some of these implications.)Yet its
existence has not penetrated the standard (positive or normative) models of
taxation, in which the effect of a tax levy is treated identically to an
upward shift in the supply curve generated by, say, increased input prices.
There is, though, a fundamental difference between the two cases,In the
latter case the purchaser presumably must pay the higher price to continue to
receive the good from the supplier.The higher equilibrium price is self-
enforcing. Whenatax is levied, though, neither party to the transaction has
a direct incentive to collect the tax.In the absence of enforcement, only—23-
particularly dutiful individuals would forward the taxes to the goverrunent.
Since no quid pro quo is attached to the payment of taxes, all parties would
attempt to be free riders.
More generally, all taxpayers have the incentive to misrepresent their
activities which have tax implications to reduce or eliminate their tax
liability.For this reason no tax structure can stand alone without an
enforcement mechanism supporting it.A theory of optimal tax systems must
encompass not only the choice of tax rules but also how they areenforced.
Allingharn and Sandmo (1972) were the first to analyze an individuals
decision about whether and how much to comply with the tax law as a choice
under uncertainty.An individual, by understating taxable income, receives
the reward of a lower tax liability if the evasion is undetected, and pays a
penalty if the evasion is detected. The decision will depend on the terms of
the gamble (the chances of being caught, the penalty if detected) and on the
individuals attitude toward risk.Subsequent work has modeled the labor
supply decision and tax evasion decision jointly and introduced more general
penalty and tax functions than considered by Allingham and Sandmo.
Sandmo (1981) built on this model of the taxpayer decision to evade to
consider the simultaneous choice of the parameters of a linear income system
tax and its enforcement structure.His model contains two types of people--
nonevaders whowork onlyin the regular economy, and evaders who divide their
time among leisure, taxed work in the regular market and untaxed work in the
underground economy.In this model presence of the underground economy will
lower the optimal marginal tax rate if it implies that regular incomeis a
less reliable indicator of economic welfare, because in this case a more
progressive tax system accomplishes less redistribution fromthe truly well
off to those truly not. It also lowers optimalprogressivity if it increases-24—
the compensated wage elasticity of regular labor supply.The tendency for a
higher marginal tax rate to increase the supply of labor to the underground
economy is not, however, an argument for a lower marginal tax rate. If
anything, the reverse is true, because the increased supply of labor is a move
in the direction of the undistorted level of labor supply to the underground
economy.
Sandino also derives the condition characterizing the optimal amount of
resources to be devoted to the detection of evaders, which unsurprisingly
reduces to equating the marginal resource cost of increasing the probability
of detection to its marginal social benefit.The trick here is correctly
interpreting the marginal social benefit of strengthening enforcement. As
stressed by Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987), it does not directly include the
revenue gained via increased voluntary compliance; that represents a transfer
from the private to the public sector. Thus there are no normative
implications of the claim of every IRS conunissioner that each additional
budget dollar allocated to the IRS will return on the order of ten dollars in
increased revenues.The marginal social benefit does, though, include the
value to risk-averse taxpayers of paying the required expected tax payment in
a less risky manner, which occurs because the higher probability of detection
deters tax evasion gambling.In a more general model, the marginal social
benefit of increased enforcement would also include such factors as the
efficiency gain from reducing the resources attracted to evasion-facilitating
activities and the reduced horizontal inequity from favoring people with
relatively less risk-averse preferences.
Mayshar (1986), adapting a model introduced by Usher (1986), places
administration and sheltering costs within a formal model of optimal taxation.
The standard result from the theory of optimal conanodity taxation continues to-25—
hold--any tax instruments that are used ought to equalize at the margin the
excess burden per dollar raised.The measure of excess burden, though, must
be modified to include the cost of administration and the resource cost of
sheltering income from the tax authorities, which includes the uncertainty of
tax payment. The optimal level of enforcement of the tax laws, viewed as one
of several tax instruments, is similarly characterized at the margin --the
ratio of excess burden (broadly defined) to revenue raised should be the same
as the ratio that applies to increasing tax rates of existing taxes.
Can Capital Income Tax Be Collected?
The collection of taxes is greatly facilitated when it is based on easily
observable transactions. Thishasimportantimplicationsforthe
implementation of an income tax, because some income flows are not reflected
in any transaction.This problem applies often, but not exclusively, to
capital income.The service flow from owner-occupied housing represents
income to the owner, but is not accompanied by a market transaction. The same
story applies to the change in the value of an asset. Sometimes there is an
observable transaction, but at a price which misrepresents the flow of real
income.I have in mind the payment of interest on nominal bonds, where the
interest payment exceeds the real flow of income because it does not take
account of the decline in the real value of the principal.
Tax policy reflects this problem. The imputed income from owner-occupied
housing is untaxed in the United States, although a few othercountries
attempt to tax it, usually ineffectually.Capital gains in the U.S.are
taxed not upon accrual but only upon realization of the gain through sale or
transfer to another party.The measurement of capital income is exacerbated
by the presence of inflation, because it is nominal rather thanreal gains
that enter the tax base.-26—
The attempt to use transaction-based measures to measure income flows
causes its own difficult problems, about which optimal taxation theory is
virtually silent.An intertemporal version of the theory can, for a given
utility function, prescribe the optimal tax rate on present and future
consumption, and thus the optimal tax rate on capital income.But a tax
imposed on, for example, capital gain realizations is not a tax on second-
period consumption, but rather on the activity of adjusting ones portfolio or
one way of drawing down ones assets for consumption.The apparent high
responsiveness of capital gains realizations to taxation reflects the
availability of highly substitutable financial strategies, and is not related
to any characteristic of utility functions such as the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
The difficulty of measuring capital income flows leads inevitably to a
situation in which the effective rate of tax on capital income varies widely
depending on the form and intermediation process for holding wealth.19
Unfortunately, economic distortions and unintended distributional consequences
arise whenever a tax system differentiates both on the basis of the financial
arrangements for holding wealth and on the recipient of the income flow from
that wealth, as it does under a progressive tax system. What tends to occur
is high tax rate individuals using lightly taxed financial arrangements for
holding wealth and low tax rate individuals using highly taxed financial
arrangements.In the extreme case, individuals simultaneously hold a long
position in a lightly-taxed asset and a short position in an identical (or
similar) asset that is highly taxed.The net result of these phenomena,
generally referred to as tax arbitrage, is that the government may collect
little or no revenue from its attempt to tax capital income progressively,
although in the process cause significant economic inefficiency.Steuerle-27-
(1985) and Gordon and Slemrod (1988) argue that this state of affairs in fact
characterized the United States of the early 1980's.The Tax Reform Act of
1986, by flattening the schedule of marginal, tax rates and reducing the
differentials in taxation of
problem somewhat.
Differential taxation of
result in not only production
risk-bearing and capricious
normative modelling of this
fundamental problem is how to
limits individuals' profiting
The problems that stem from the difficulty of measuring income have led
some scholars (notably Bradford, 1980) to advocate the scrapping of income
taxation in favor of a consumption-based tax. Of course, the change from an
income tax to a consumption tax might also be supported on optimal taxation
grounds, depending on the nature of utility functions.The problem of tax
arbitrage suggests that the rate of tax on capital income is not as important
as its uniformity with respect to the financial structure, intermediation
process, and the identity of the wealth owner. A move towardeither a truly
comprehensive income tax, which taxes capital income uniformly at a positive
rate, or a move toward a consumption tax, which taxes capital income uniformly
at a zero rate, may be an improvement. Which is preferable depends onwhich
system is more likely to be able to sustain uniformity.Bradford argues that,
because consumption is easier to measure than income, a consumption tax is
superior.Graetz (1979) and the American Bar Association (1985), though.
conclude that a consumption tax would not be significantly less complex than a
comprehensive income tax.
capital income, undoubtedly has mitigated this
financial assets and wealthowners will generally
inefficiency, but also inefficient allocation of
distributional consequences. Positive and
phenomenon is in its infancy. A difficult
characterize an equilibrium, in particular what
from tax arbitrage opportunities.-28-
From this perspective the winner of the great debate over the relative
merits of the consumption versus the income tax rests on an issue of
measurability and thus is firmly in the realm of optimal tax systems rather
than optima]. taxation. Earlier we saw that the question of whether to
sacrifice the redistributional flexibility of a graduated tax system in favor
of a flat-rate tax also rests heavily on the administrative advantages of the
latter.A comprehensive income tax with a flat rate would arguably offer
nearly as much gain in simplicity as would a tax based on consumption rather
than income.
A Look to the Future: Some Speculation and a Research Agenda
Changing Technology
I have argued in this paper that future research in the normative theory
of taxation ought to shift its focus from the structure of consumer
preferences to the technology of collecting taxes and those aspects of the
economy which affect tax collection, and from optimal tax rate structure to
optimal tax systems. This is an exciting and challenging change in
perspective. It is exciting because preferences (economists are accustomed to
assuming) are relatively stable over time, but technology is clearly not
stable, whether one is discussing the technology of producing steel or of
collecting taxes.Changing technology implies that what is an optimal tax
system today for the United States is not likely to be optimal twenty years
from now.
Compared to 20 years ago, the Internal Revenue Service of today has a
tremendously improved capacity to match information reports of parties to
transactions to information reported on tax returns.It also faces an
innensely more sophisticated financial system in which the transaction costs-29-
of hiding income have shrunk.This technological change may, for example,
greatly diminish the ability of governments to cheaply enforce a residence-
based capital income tax. When funds can evade taxation by crossing borders.
Countries may be forced to rely on origin-based taxes such as the value-added
tax.Some have argued (e.g., Bird, (1988)) that the attempt to measure the
portion of the income of multinational firms that originates in any country
may have to be abandoned in favor of a formula apportionment rule similar to
that used in state corporation income tax systems.
I have shownearlierthat increasing financial sophistication places
great strains on tax systems which attempt to tax capital income in an
incoherent fashion and on any system of graduated tax rates.There is a
growing awareness that the kinds of behavioral responses to taxation that
matter in the real world have little to do with the structure of utility
functions, but with the availability of financial strategies that circumvent
the intent of the tax laws.
Scholars of the historical evolution of tax structure, notably Fiinrichs
(1966) and Musgrave (1969), have stressed the importance of tax administration
issues. Modern tax structure development has generally been characterized by
a shift from excise, customs, and property taxes to corporate incomeand
progressive individual incometaxes.2° This shift has been made possible by
the expansion of the market sector and relative decline of the rural Sector,
the concentration of employment in larger establishments, and the growing
literacy of the population. Further changes in the technology of tax
administration may now be pushing us away from progressive income taxes toward
tax systems that rely more on broad-based consumption taxes such as thevalue-
added tax and much flatter rate structures for incometaxation.21-30-
AResearch Agenda
The shift in focus to a theory of optimal tax systems is challenging as
well as exciting because it requires a rethinking of both theoretical and
empirical research. The normative theory must come to terms with such issues
as the choice of tax instruments, the optimal design of enforcement policy.
the tax treatment of financial strategies (as opposed to goods or income
flows) and more generally, must develop a descriptive and normative framework
in which to evaluate the issue of tax arbitrage. These are difficult issues.
although progress is already being made.
To make the theory of optimal tax systems operational, empirical work
must proceed on the technology of raising taxes (This is the analogue to the
critical role for optimal taxation theory of the empirical investigation of
the structure of individuals preferences). This effort includes estimating
the collection cost of alternative tax systems (for example, Sandford, 1987;
Slemrod, 1989). It is important that the inputs to this process be related to
a multidimensional measure of output. More resources devoted to tax
collection may certainly increase revenue, and can also reduce the horizontal
and vertical inequities that accompany tax evasion.The deterrent effect of
enforcement is another critical topic for empirical research. Of course this
does depend critically on one aspect of preferences--taxpayers' attitudes
toward bearing risk. Although plagued by data inadequacies, some research has
begun on this topic (e.g., Clotfelter, 1983; Dubin and Wilde, 1986).
During its reign as the predominant normative theory of taxation, optimal
taxation has generated many valuable insights about the relationships between
policy objectives, the structure of the economy, and the availability of tax
instruments.In the more general framework of optimal tax systems, optimal
taxation emerges as a special case in which the set of tax instruments is-31—
fixed and enforcement of any available instrument is costless. These
assumptions preclude the study of a variety of important issues.To be a
guide to current and future tax policy action, the more encompassing framework
of optimal tax systems is essential.—32-
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Footnotes
1. For more thorough surveys of the theory of optimal taxation, see Auerbach
(1985), Stern (1987), and Stiglitz (1988).
2.The theory of optimal taxation does not consider the political process
that generates tax policy and does not deal with the possibility that
policymakers objectives may not be maximizing social welfare.It also
attaches no weight to the pre-tax distribution of income. The
desirability of any tax policy is judged solely by its consequences for
individuals and is not judged independently on how closely it meets
abstract principles such as fairness and efficiency.A concern for
fairness may, though, be imbedded in the concavity of the social welfare
function, and the desire for efficiency will be reflected in the decrease
in individual welfare levels caused by inefficiency.
3. Uniformity is optimal only if there is implicit (also known as quasi)
separability between leisure and goods; that is, when all goods complement
leisure equally. Formally, two goods are quasi-separable from leisure if
the expenditure function can be written e(w,f,(q,U),U), where w is the
wage rate, q is a vector of goods prices, and U is utility. (Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980), p. 379)
4. A utility function is weakly separable when the marginal rate of
substitution between any two goods is not affected by the quantity of
leisure consuuied.Note that this condition is quite different than the
quasi-separabilityrequired foroptimaluniformconunodity taxes
(equivalent to a tax only on earnings) in a one-person world with no lump-
sumtaxesavailable.
5. The lifetime budget constraint of a representative individual can be
written as-39-
C2
(A-i) C1(l+t1) + i + rU+ +wL—w,
where C1 and C2 are first and second-period consumption, respectively, t1
and t2 are the two consumption tax rates. w is the wage rate, r is the
rate of interest, and L is leisure (out of a unit timeendowment). When
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which shows the equivalence of uniform comodity taxes to a wage tax at
rate t/(i+t). or
C
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makesclear that when t2 exceeds t1, capital income is subject to a
positive tax, and when t1 is less than t2, capital income is subsidized.
6. The assumptions of the model imply that the welfare of any consumer
depends only on his endowment and the vector of prices he faces.
7. A formal model of the impact of costly administration on the desirability
of production efficiency is presented in Helier and Shell (1974).
8. Because a tax schedule may feature rebates rather than taxes at some
levels of income, it is really the optimal tax-and-transfer system that is
at issue.
9. Even more surprising is the result that, when there exist two types of
labor (skilled and unskilled), the marginal tax on the most able
individual should be negative.This causes a second-order efficiency-40-
loss, but redistributes welfare to less able individuals because it
increases the relative wage of unskilled labor.
10. Note that this result, when combined with Mirrlees' finding that the
marginal tax rate must be nonnegative at all income levels, implies that
the optimal income tax system cannot have Continuously increasing marginal
tax rates.It does not, though, say anything about what the average tax
rate at the top should be.
11. Note that, although the marginal tax rate is approximately constant, the
average tax rate (tax liability divided by income) increases with income
due to the presence of the positive exemption level.
12. The revenue requirement in this example was about twenty percent of net
output.
13. Stiglitz (1988) has also criticized the literature's reliance on a
utilitarian social welfare function which embodies value judgments about
interpersonal welfare comparisons. He has advocated disentangling the
latterfromefficiencyconsiderations,and concentrating on the
characteristics of Pareto-efficient tax structures.
14. See McLure (1984) for an interesting perspective on the effect of academic
thinking on the tax reform movement.The policy influence of the high
distortionary cost of taxation is somewhat ironic because the profession
has since moved away from its belief in high behavioral elasticities. In
particular, the median professional estimate of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution is undoubtedly much lower now than in the early
l980s. For example, compare Hall (1988) and Stun,iers (1982).
15. See Hulten and Klayman (1988) for a statement of this view.
16. The desirability of making the choice between tax instruments an
endogenous variable has been noted by. among others, Hahn (1973. and—41-
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, P. 363). who state that for a complete
theory of the choice of tax base, a fully articulated model is necessary
of the information available to the government and cost of observing the
different characteristics.' Diamond (1987, p. 640) agrees that this would
be ideal, but adds that the standard simplifications may do little damage
to the policy conclusions if the set of feasible policies is well chosen.
although the problem of choosing well is a difficult one.'
17. According to the U.S. Treasury Department (1984), the base of a value-
added tax that excluded the rental value of housing, medical care, food.
and certain other items would be $2.06 billion.Thus a 71 value-added
would raise $144.2 billion, compared to an estimated collection cost of
$4.2 billion.There is a large element of fixed cost, so that the
collection cost per dollar raised falls as tax rates increase.
18. Such high rates of compliance apparently do not apply to all countries.
Evasion of the value-added tax in Italy, for example, has been estimated
to reduce collections by as much as 40 percent (Pedone, 1981). Income tax
evasion is notoriously high in Italy as well.
19. Keasurement difficulties are not the only source of differential taxation
of capital income. The government often intentionally subsidizes
particular strategies for holding wealth, as in the case of the exemption
from federal tax of the interest from state and local government
securitiee.
-
20.Although Hinrichs points out that tax structure development beganwith
direct taxes rather than indirect taxes. See also Kau and Rubin (1981).
21. The Danish tax reform passed in 1985 is a fascinating recent development.
It creates a separate tax schedule for capital income (interest,
dividends, taxable capital gains, rents, and profits frombusiness-42-
enterprises) and personal income (predominantly labor income).Capital
income is taxed at a flat 502 rate, and capital income losses are not
deductible from personal income.One objective of this system is to
reduce the revenue losses from the kind of tax arbitrage discussed in the
text.